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THE NEW YORK SLMULTANEOUS DEATH LAW
FRANCIS X. CONWAYt AND WILLIAM I. BERTSCHE*

By the partial adoption of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act,' it is
now provided in New York2 that:
"Where title to property or the devolution thereof depends upon priority of death and there is no sufficient evidence that the persons have
died otherwise than simultaneously, the property of .each person shall
be disposed of as'if he had survived. . ..'Is
However, if the commorientes 4 were joint tenants or tenants by the
entirety, the effect of the statute is that the joint property shall pass as
though they were equal tenants in common; 5 also where those dying were
an insured and the beneficiary of his life or accident insurance policy
the death benefits are to be distributed as if the insured had survived.6
Specific provisions in wills, trusts, deeds or insurance contracts calling
for a different- rule of distribution will, however, be given efect.' Moreover, th6 statute does not apply to the disposition of property of a person who has died before its effective date or to the disposition of property passing under an instrument, other than a will, executed before such
date."
The Nature of the Problem
The problem presented when two or more persons die in a common
t

Lecturer in Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
Member of New York Bar.
1. 9 U. L. A. 659 (1941). According to the 1944 cumulative supplement to 9 U. L. A.
-twenty-four states and the Territory of Hawaii have adopted the Uniform Act.
2. N. Y. Laws 1941, c. 479, effective Sept. 1, 1943, adding § 89 to'the DECEDENT ESTATE
LAw, 13 McKnEY's CoNso.mATED LAWS op N. Y.
3. N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 89, subd. 1; UNI=FoRm SMuLTANEous DEATH ACT, 9 U.
L A. § 1.
4. The word "commorientes", denoting "persons who perish at the same time in consequence of the same calamity." (BiAcK's LAW DICT. (3d ed. 1933)], has been used
throughout this discussion for the sake of convenience.
5. N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 89, subd. 2; UNIwoRm SiuLTAAxous DEATH ACr, 9 U.
L. A. § 3.
6. N. Y. DEc. EST. LAW § 89, subd. 3; UmioR SmnmuLTAwEous DEATH ACT, 9 U.
L. A. § 4.
7. N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 89, subd. 4; Ur ioRm SImULTANEOuS DEATH ACT, 9 U.
L. A. § 6.
8. N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 89, subd. 5. Cf. UNInoRx SmwLTA xous DEATH ACT, 9 U.
L. A. § 5. The change made by the New York Legislature in this provision of the Uniform
Act is discussed infra, page 37.
*
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disaster, there being no evidence as to the order of death, is an intricate
one, not easily solved without recourse to arbitrary rules of law. Lord
Mansfield is said to have admitted that he knew of no legal principle
upon which such cases might be decided, and felt bound to advise the
litigants to settle out of court.' With the problem unsolved, title to property may hang in abeyance. The necessity for a solution to the question
has resulted in three different views: (1) a presumption that one party
had survived; (2) a presumption that death had been simultaneous; and
(3) that no presumption at all should be indulged in.
(1) The presumption of survivorship is that of the Roman Law,'"
under which, where a father and son perished in a common disaster, and
the son had not reached puberty, the father was presumed to have survived; the presumption being the reverse where the son had reached
puberty." Similarly, the Code Napoleon' 2 provides that where persons
entitled to inherit from one another' 3 die in the same catastrophe, without
any possibility of ascertaining who died first, the following rules shall
govern: If all were over 60 years of age, the youngest is presumed to
have survived; if they are all under 15 years of age, the eldest is presumed to have survived; if they are between 15 and 60 years of age,
the male is presumed to have survived, provided there is a difference of
age of not more than one year; or if they are all males or all females
the youngest is presumed to have survived. 1 4 The Louisiana legislature15 has adopted the same provision with the sole difference that
where the commorientes are all between 15 and 60 years of age, and there
is more than one ydar's difference in age, the youngest will be presumed
6
tp have survived, even as between a male and a female.' This type of
9. See marginal notes to Taylor v. Diplock, 2 Phillim, 261, 267, 161 Eng. Rep. Repr.
1137, 1140 (1815) ; see also the Commissioners' prefatory note to the U2ri=oer SImULTANEous DEATH AcT, 9 U. L. A. 657, 658 which calls the problem "un-resoluble."
10. DIGEST, Liber 34, Title 5 (Scott's Translation).
11. See Cowman v. Rogers, 73 Md. 403, 21 AtI. 64 (1891).
12. FRENCH CvI CODE (Wright, 1908) Third Book, Title I, Chapter I, Arts. 720-722.
13. A statute including this provision is not restricted to cases of intestate succession,
but applies as well in cases of testate succession. Succession of Langles, 105 La. 39, 29 So.
739 (1900.). An obelisk in a New Orleans cemetery, inscribed simply and majestically
"Angele Marie Langles-105 La. 39" bears enduring witness to the rule of law applied in
Succession of Langles.
14. See Chapman, Presumption of Survivorship (1914). 62 U. oF PA. L. REV. 585, 588.
15. LouisIANA Cvn. CODE (Dart. 1942 Supp.) Arts. 936-938. For a discussion of the
Louisiana presumptions see Comment (1938) 12 TuLANE L. REv. 623.
16. This change was intended to take care of the situation disclosed in Robinson v.
Gallier, 2 Woods 178. 20 Fed. Cas. 1006, No. 11951 (C. C. A. La. 1875) where a male of
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statute has been adopted by various other states. 17
(2) The presumption that death was simultaneous is found in the
Mohammedan Law of India'8 and In the Austrian,1 9 German2" and
Italian 21 Civil Codes. Apparently none of the United States has adopted

a similar rule.
(3)

The view that no presumption at all will be indulged in is that

of the common law.2 2 While the most honest of the three views, this
approach to the problem has the definite drawback that it fails to estab-

lish a basis for the distribution of the property of- the decedents.23 What
is really required is a rule of law regarding the. devolution of property
dealing with the situation arising from simultaneous deaths. 4
In 1925, Parliament wiped out the common law principle that no presumption exists where the order of death cannot be inferred, by enacting

a statute25 which creates a presumption of'survivorship based upon the
68 years of age was commorient with a female of 44. No provision of the Louisiana Code
took care of such a situation; see Louisiana Legislation of 1938 Pertaining to the Civil Code
(1938) 1 LA.' L. REv. 83, 87; Comment (1938) 12 Tui"E L. REv. 623. The Quebec
Civil Code, Arts. 604-605 presumes that, where a male and a female between 15 and 60
are commorient, the male survived.
17. See for example: CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1937) § 1963 (40); No. DAKOTA
CODE Civ. PROC. § 7936 (40); also see PUERTO RICO REV. STAT. AND CODES (1911)- § 1470
39; PHIrIPPn;E ISLANDS ANN. CODE OF CIv. PRAc. (Fisher, 1925) § 334 1 37. Maryland
had adopted this type of statute in 1920, but in 1941 it was abrogated in favor of the"
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act. For a strong argument in favor of the adoption
of these civil law presumptions see Wislizenus, Survival in Death by Common Disaster
(1925) 6 ST. Louis L. REv. 1.
18. See Cowman v. Rogers, 73 Md. 403, 21 Ad. 64 (1891).
19. AuSTRIAN Cvm CODE (1891) Part I, First Title, III, Art. 25.
20. GERMAN Civ. CODE, Book I, Part I, Title I, Art. 20.
21. ITALIAN CiM CODE, Liber I, Title I, Art. 4.
22. Newell v. Nkhols, 75 N. Y. 78 (1878); Wing v. Angrave, 8 H. L. Cas. 183, 11 Eng.
Rep. Repr. 397 (1860); Young Women's Christian Home v. French, 187 U. S. 401, 23
Sup. Ct. 184 (1903). A few of the earlier cases both in England and America seemingly
applied the civil law presumptions. Coyle v. Leach, 8 Metc. 371 (Mass. 1844); Colvin v.
H. M. Procurator-General, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 92, 162 Eng. Rep. Repr. 518 (1827); Sillick v.
Booth, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 117, 61 Eng. Rep. Repr. 816 (1841). See also Moehring v. Mitchell,
1 Barb. Ch. 264 (N. Y. 1846).
23. "The reason for the difficulty of administration is that it is impossible to know which
of the persons has survived. Yet the 'common law rule' in effect says that the person who
claims by virtue of an alleged survivorship must prove the survivorship which is 'tantamount to demanding the impossible," Commissioners' prefatory note to the Uniform
Simultaneous Death Act, 9 U. L. A. 657.
24. See 9 WiGoaoRE, EvIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2532a.
25. LAw OF PROPERTY AcT, 1925, § 184.
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seniority of the commorientes. Under the present English statutory rule
the younger is presumed to have survived the elder, regardless of sex,
health or other factors.2" The English statute may be subject to the
criticism that it arbitrarily fixes upon one factor, age,2 7 (certainly not
the most significant evidentiary factor in resolving an issue of this kind)
to the exclusion of all other circumstances. Of course, the very purpose
in enacting such legislation is to reach some conclusion, which inevitably
will be more or less arbitrary, regarding the distribution of property.
The choice of age as the determining factor does have the merit that
such fact is easily and definitely established, more so than any of the
other circumstantial evidence (aside from sex) usually available in cases
of contemporaneous death. Utilization of the less objective circumstances
of strength or health as factors determinative of survivorship would
necessitate comparisons and a consideration of conflicting inferences
which the enactment of such a statutory presumption seeks to avoid.
In its practical operation the common law rule against presumptions
was ordinarily tantamount to a presumption of simultaneous death. Thus
where A, having bequeathed all his property to B, perishes with B in a
common disaster, B's heirs would have to prove that B survived A in
order to obtain A's estate, and, there being no proof of survivorship, B's
heirs would necessarily fail and A's heirs would take. A presumption in
favor of simultaneous death, it will be noted, would carry the same re26. The Act provides that where the order of death is shown to be uncertain "such
deaths shall (subject to any order of the court) . .. be presumed to have occurred in order
of seniority. . . ." In respect to the discretion apparently vested in the court by the phrase
within parentheses it was said in the recent case of lt re Lindop [1942] Ch. 377, 2 All. Eng.
Rep. 46 (apparently the first reported opinion to consider this question) that the purpose
of the exception was not to permit the court to disregard the statutory presumption but to
enable it to receive evidence on the order of death "and if the evidence is such as to displace the statutory presumption, to act upon that evidence." Such an interpretation
renders the parenthetical provision meaningless since, even without it, the presumption
would only operate where the order of death is uncertain as a result of a lack of evidence;
see (1942) 86 THE SOLICITOR'S JonrwAL 263. It is submitted that the decision deprives
the statute of an elasticity which might have proved helpful. With the statute given this
restrictive interpretation, its consequences may at times border upon the absurd. Thus
where a week-old baby and a strapping man in his physical prime are drowned in a shipwreck, the former would be presumed to have survived, and the court would have no discretion in the matter.
27. One difficulty in using age as the determinant is presented by the synchronous death
of twins. In such a case it would seem they would have to be held to have died simultaneously, if there were lacking evidence of the order of their birth.
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suilts.28 While in the ordinary case, as above, the practical result is the
same, an important distinction is shown by the famous English case of
Wood v. Angrave.-9 A and B, husband and wife, perished in a common
disaster each leaving all his or her property to the other, with a substitutional gift to C in case A or B died during the other's lifetime, as the case

might be. Although if C could have established that the deaths were not
contemporaneous, he would have taken regardless of which one died
first, since, -as it turned out, C could not prove that fact, neither could

he establish the one through whom he claimed and, therefore, the legacies lapsed.30 If C had been aided by a presumption that- both A and B
had died at the same time; he would, it might be argued, have obtained
both legacies because in that case he would have taken under each will
separately.
The common law rule applicable to the case of the death of two or
more persons in a common disaster has been accurately summarized as
follows in the New York case of Matter of Burza: s '
"1) There is no presumption either of survivorship or of simultaneous
death.
28. See In re Wilbor, 20 R. I. 126, 37 AUt. 634 (1897) ; Russell v. Hallett, 23 Kan. 276,
278 (1880). In a case of intestacy, for instance, where an intestate and his nearest of kin
die without proof of which one survived, the next of kin of the intestate will take the
intestate's property on the theory that such next of kin, need not prove the non-survivorship of the deceased nearest of kin, a negative proposition; In re Greene's Settlement
L. R. 1 Eq. 288 (1865); Johnson v. Merithew, 80 Me. 111, 13 At. 132 (1888). Matter of
Burza, 151- Misc. 577, 272 N. Y. Supp. 248 (Surr. Ct. 1934); see, Whittier, Problems of Sur-vivorship (1904) 16 GRns BAG 237. Contra In re Evans Estate, 291 N. W. 460 (Iowa,

1940) in which it is held that the next of kin claiming the intestate's property have the
burden of proving that the nearer next of kin who died with the intestate had not survived the intestate.
29. 8 H. L. Cas. 183, 11 Eng. Rep. Repr. 397 (1860).
30. An American case which reaches a contrary. conclusion and which is cited with
approval as reaching an obviously just result, is Fitzgerald v. Ayres, 179 S. W. 289 (Texas,
1915), noted (1916) 29 HARv. L. REv. 461. The theory upon which the court proceeded
is that presumptively the intention of the testator Was that, should the primary legacy
fail for any reason, the gift over was to take effect. The court based this rule of construction upon the statement in the opinion of Van Vorst, "J. in Newell v. Nichols, 12
Hun. 604, 622 (1st Dep't 1878), aff'd, 75 N. Y. 78 (1878), that the words "if the legatee
should not survive" means "if the preceding legacy should from any cause fail." However,
the facts of Fitzgerald v. Ayres were quite distinguishable from Newell v. Nichols since
in the latter case there was no question of a reversion. It should be noted that the court
in Newell v. Nichols definitely applied the doctrine of Wing v. Angrave. Also see Cook v.
Caswell, 81 Tex. 678, 17 S. W. 385 (1891).
31. 151 Misc. 577, 272 N. Y. Supp. 248 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
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2) There is no presumption of a survivorship from difference in age,
sex or even relative strength.
3) Proof of the facts and circumstances concerning the survival of
one or the other must be adduced, In the absence of proof of facts and
circumstances, the test of experts is sheer speculation and must be disregarded.
4) The party asserting survivorship has the burden of proving it."
This is the rule prevailing in a majority of the States, generally as a
matter of common law, 2 but sometimes through express statutory declaration. 3
Concerning the Distribution of Property
The New York Simultaneous Death Lhw provides as follows:
"Where the title to property or the devolution thereof depends upon priority
of death and there is no sufficient evidence that the persons have died otherwise
than simultaneously, the property of each person shall be disposed of' as if he
had survived, except as otherwise provided in this section."
At the outset it should be recognized that, although the above subdivision of the statute does not set forth the statement of a presumption,
and certainly not one of survivorship, it does in :effect adopt the presumption that death was simultaneous, since the disposition of the
property directed by the statute is that which would be made were it
presumed that the deaths were simultaneous.3 5 Of course, by the express
wording of the statute, the presumption, implied in its provisions, that
death occurred simultaneotisly is a rebuttable'one. An Ohio statute,3"
which became effective in 1932, raises a presumption that, as far as the
disposition of property is concerned, deaths resulting from a common
accident within thirty days of each other shall be considered simul37
taneous. The Ohio Supreme Court held the statute constitutional. It
32. There is a collection of leading cases in Chapman, The Presumption of Survivorship,
(1914) 62 U. OF PA. L. REV. 585.
33. For example GEORGIA CODE ANN. (1933)

11113-906

(property of each commorient

shall descend to the respective heirs,%excluding each as heir of the other; section only operates when decedents could inherit from each other; death in common disaster not
required).
34.

N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 89, subd. 1;, UNiFoaar SIMULTANEOUS DEATH AcT, 9 U.

L. A. § 1.
35. See note 28 supra.
36. Omo GENERAL CODE ANN. (Page, 1935) § 10503-18.
37. Ostrander v. Preece, 129 Ohio St. 625, 196 N. E: 670 (1935), appeal dismissed 296
U. S. 543, 56 Sup. Ct. 151 (1935). One interesting application of the Ohio statute was
pointed out in the recent case of In re Metzger, 140 Ohio St. 50, 42 N. E. (2d) 443 (1942).
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might be urged that such a presumption, divorced from the purpose for
which it was created, would be unconstitutional as violating due process,
since a presumption should have its basis in the reasonableness of the
fact presumed, 8 and that there is no reason for presuming generally that
two persons, dying under such circumstances (i.e., within thirty days of
each other), die simultaneously. However, as in the case of the Ohio
legislation, it is obvious that what is intended in the Uniform Act is a
new rule for the succession to property and it would. seem that the State
has power to enact such legislation 9 The necessity for such a solution
to the difficult problem arising from death in a common disaster has frequently been advocated.40 It has been pointed out that the ultimate
problem has always been the determination of the person to whom the
property is to go and that the only purpose of inquiring into the order
of death is to answer that problem. 41 Why should the identity of the
person entitled to property vary depending upon whether A or B died a
split second before the other, especially since there is no question of
depriving the actual but momentary survivor of any enjoyment of the
property? The Uniform Act disregards this factor. No account is taken
of the inherent probabilities of the order of death. On the contrary, a
rule having no relation thereto is established in order to furnish certainty in the determination of the person who shall take the property involved.
W died three hours after H, her husband, both deaths being the result of the same disaster.
It was leld that by virtue of the arbitrary rule of the Ohio statute, W was never a widow
and hence her administrator could not recover the statutory widow's allowance from H's
estate. The court stated that such an arbitrary presumption was not unreasonable as applied
in this case since the purpose for the allowance had failed.
38. "Under our decisions) a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no
rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection between
the two in common experience." Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 467, 63 Sup. Ct. 1241,
1245 (1943); see also Manley v. Georgia, 279 U. S. 1, 49 Sup. Ct. 215 (1929); Western and
Atkinson R. R. v. Henderson, 279 U. S. 639, 49 Sup. Ct. 445 (1925); Comment (1943)
31 CALir. L. REV. 316, discussing the California presumptions of survivorship, and pointing
out that, even though the conclusion is drawn in the face of obviously inconsistent facts,
the conclusion is not haphazard. "It is in accordance with circumstantial evidence, even
though the bearing of this evidence may be remote. In other words there is at least an
attempt' to decide according to probabilities."
39. Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U. S. 556, 562, 62 Sup. Ct. 398 (1942); Matte of.
Bergdorf, 206 N. Y. 309, 99 N. E. 714 (1912); cf. Connor, The Nature of Succession (1939)
8 FoRDmAn L. Rlv. 51.
40. Tracy and Adams, Evidence of Survivorship in Cdmmon Disaster Cases (1940)
38 Mici. L. REv. 801, 830; 9 WiGMoRE, EvmENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2532a.
41. 9 WGroRoE, EvmENcE (3d ed. 1940) § 2532a.
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To show how the new enactment will operate and to point out the
changes thereby worked in the New York law, a few examples will be
given. Applying the statute to the state of facts disclosed in Wood v.
Angrave,' to which reference has already been made, the substitutional
legatee named in the reciprocal wills of the commorientes would receive
the legacy, or, to be more accurate, the legacies.43 It would appear that,
with the possible exception of this instance, the first subdivision of the
statute is a mere codification of existing New York law." For instance,
the New York law relative to the situation where a beneficiary under a
will and the testator are not shown to have died otherwise than simultaneously seems to remain unchanged by the enactment. Prior to the
statute it was clear that the legacy would have lapsed since those claiming through the legatee would be unable to sustain the burden of proof
as to the legatee's survivorship.' Under the statute, the result would appear to be the same, since the first subdivision provides that in such a case
"the property of each person shall be disposed of as if he had survived."
In other words, the property in question is that belonging to the testator
at the time of his death46 and, as to the devolution of that property, he
is deemed to have survived. A contrary conclusion would require rather
obvious reasoning in a vicious circle: the property involved belongs to
the beneficiary because he is deemed to have survived and he is deemed
42.' 8 H. L. Cas. 183, 11 Eng. Rep. Repr. 397 (1860). We will assume that this would
represent the previous New York rule in view of Newell v. Nichols, 75 N. Y. 78 (1878);
see note 30, supra.
43. The application of the statute to the above situation results in the anomalous determination that each of the testators survived the other. As a matter of practical administration the will of each testator -would be separately probated and the substitutional
legatee would take the separate property of each testator.
44. Thus, Surrogate Foley states: "This is the present rule under judicial authorities."
Foley, Inhertattce Law Changes, N. Y. L. J., July 14, 1943, p. 98, col. 2.
45. St. John v. Andrews Institute, 191 N. Y. 254, 83 N. E. 981 (1908). Also see Note
(1903) 16 HAuv. L. REv. 368 which discusses the *correct reasoning upon which the devisee's
heir is defeated as distinguished from the reasoning used to defeat the next of kin of the
deceased legatee. None of the decisions seem to have adopted the refined reasoning advanced in this note.
46. Since the statute only applies to "the property of" the commorient under whom a
persons claims, query whether the statute would apply in the following case: A bequeaths
property to B with a general power of appointment. B appoints by will to C, if living,
otherwise to D. 3 and C die contemporaneously. Clearly the heirs of B would not be entitled to the property, but might not D successfully claim the property upon the argument
that by a liberal construction of the statute the property had belonged to B? The property
would be taxable to B's estat6 under the federal estate tax; INT. REV. CODE § 811 (f), 26
U. S. C. A. § 811 (f) (1942).
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to have survived because the property belongs to him. On the contrary,
as already pointed out, distribution under the statute is based on what
is in effect a presumption of simultaneous deaths. In addition, there is no
sound reason of policy which would suggest the enactment of a statute
favoring the next of kin of the legatee in such a case. If the legatee was
closely related to the testator, the legacy will not lapse."' If the testator
wishes to disinherit his statutory distributees by preventing the lapse
of a legacy, he may provide in his will for a distribution as though the
legatee had survived, in the event that he and the legatee die simultaneously, and the provision, under the express terms of the statute, will
be given effect.4 8 If his intention to disinherit is not expressed by a complete disposition of his estate to others, the statutory provisions relating to the execution of wills49 would seem to be a sufficient ground for
not giving effect to such an intention. 0
The case of St. John v. Andrews Institute51 not only involved this question of survivorship between a testator and a legatee, but also another
novel feature. The testator, his wife and the legatee had, all three,
47. A bequest to a descenlant, brother or sister of atestator will not lapse if there are
alive descendants of the deceased legatee. N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAW § 29. Of course, a substitutional gift vill prevent the operation of this section, Matter of Neydorff, 193 App. Div.
531, 184 N. Y. Supp. 551 (3d Dep't 1920). In Matter of Macklin, 177 Misc. 432, 30 N. Y.
S. (2d) 706 (Surr. Ct. 1941) a father and his son, a legatee under the father's will, perished
in a common disaster. The son's children were held to be entitled to the legacy even though
they could not. pgrove, in accordance with the language of section 29, that the legatee had
died "during the lifetime of the testator." The court held the legislative intent Was to preserve thed gift whenever the legatee "fails to survive" the testator and that the burden of
proof of survivorship of the legatee did not rest upon the children. Contra: Carpenter v.
Severin, 201 Iowa 969, 204 N. W. 448 (1925), where the statute provided against failure
of a devise "if a devisee dies before the testator."
48. N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAW § 90, subd. 4; UNiFORm SimuLTANEous DEATH ACT, 9 U.
L. A. § 6. See Matter of Fowles, 222 N. Y. 222, 234, 239, 118 N. E. 611, 614, 615 (1918);
Matter of Piffard, 111 N. Y. 410, 18 N. E. 718 (1888); In re Valdez's Trusts [18893 40 Ch.
Div. 159 (1888); Evans, Incorporation by Reference, Integration, and Non-Testamentary
Act (1925) 25 Co.. L. Rnv. 878, 898; see infra, page 36.
49. N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 21.
50. A "wll" merely disinheriting an heir has no effect. In re Trumble's Will, 199 N. Y.
454, 92 N. E. 1073 (1910); Nagle v. Connard, 79 N. J. Eq. 124, 81 Atl. 841 (1911); Tea
v. Millen, 257 Ill. 624, 101 N. E. 209 (1913). However, it has been held that i codicil revoking a will "so that I may die intestate" constitutes a bequest to the next of kin.
Brenchley v. Lynn, 2 Rob. Ecc. 441, 163 Eng. Rep. Repr. 1375. (1852).
51. 191 N. Y. 254, 83 N. E. 981 (1908), aff'g 117'App. Div. 698, 102 N. Y. Supp. 808
(Ist Dep't 1907); see also the connected-case of Matter of St. John, 104 App. Div. 460, 93
N. Y. Supp. 836 (1st Dep't 1905).
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perished in a fire. It was found that the legatee survived the testator but,
as to the testator and his wife, the relative time of their deaths was held
to be unascertainable. Since the will of the testator gave morb than onehalf of his estate, after the payment of his debts, to a charitable corporation, such devise or bequest would have been invalid under section
17 of the New York Decedent Estate Law to the extent that it exceeded
one-half, if his wife had survived him. Since there was no proof that the
wife survived the testator, the court held that section 17 did not apply.
Would the pertinent provision of the Simultaneous Death Law call for
a different conclusion today? It would not appear so. It is true that the
immediate members of the testator's family, who are given the right by
section 17 to object to the charitable gift where one of their number survived the testator,52 will receive the prohibited excess of the charitable
gift, if there is no residuary clause.5" However, it does not follow that,
under the facts of St. John v. Andrews Institute5 4 on that account the
wife should be considered to have survived the testator. As pointed- out
in the preceding paragraph, this would involve a prior assumption that
the property belonged to the wife at the time of her death in order to
render operative the new statutory rule. The following observation of
the Court of Appeals in the St. John case would still hold force:
"There was no point of time when the title of Mr. Andrews was divested at
which Mrs. Andrews could have taken it, and in construing such statute [section
17] her simultaneous death is in effect the same as a death before his debth." 55
The fact that the Simultaneous Death Law constitutes a rule of property rather than a rule of evidence is emphasized when we consider it
from the standpoint of conflict of laws. At the outset it should be clear
that the Uniform Act does not become applicable merely because the
deaths occur in New York State, or the question of title to property
resulting from such deaths is litigated here. The general principle is
that the devolution of immovable property is governed by the law of
its situs,5 whereas the law of the domicile of the owner of personal prop52. Since 1929 (N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 229 § 3) these members of the family are the spouse,
child, descendant, or parent. See In re Plaster's Estate, 179 Misc. 80, 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 498
(Surr. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 266 App. Div. 439, 43 N. Y. S. (2d) 1 (3d Dep't 1943).
53. The excess then vests as intestate property; Matter of Logasa, 163 Misc. 628, 297
N. Y. Supp. 730 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
54. 191 N. Y. 254, 83 N. E. 981 (1908), aff'g 117 App. Div. 698, 102 N. Y. Supp. 808
(1st Dep't 1907).
55. St. John v. Andrews Institute, 191 N. Y. 254, 276, 83 N. E. 981, 987 (1908).
56. Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186, 20 Sup. t. 873 (1900); Peck v. Cary, 27 N. Y.
9, 11 (1863).

19441

NEW YORK SIMULTANEOUS DEATH LAW

erty governs its devolution.5 7 Accordingly, the Uniform Act will apparently not be operative where a different rule of distribution obtains in
the jurisdiction where the real property involved is situated, or where
the decedent, who owned the personal property to be distributed, had
resided.
The Case of Joint Tenants
The problem of the effect of the contemporaneous demise of joint
tenants seems to have been first introduced into the law in an interesting case in which father and son were hanged together from one cart
and where it was found that one of them survived the other because his
legs were seen to shake during the hanging after those of the other."6 In
Bradshaw v. Toulmin,"9 Lord Thurlow was of the opinion that if joint
tenants perish by one blow, the jointly-held estate will remain in their
respective heirs as joint tenants. Blackstone, however, believed that a
tenancy in common would result.6 " The leading American case6 holds
that an estate by the entirety descends as if the commorientes had been
tenants in common.
The second subdivision of the New York law provides:
"Where there is no sufficient evidence that two joint tenants or tenants by the
entirety have died otherwise than simultaneously the property so held shall be
distributed one-half as if one had survived and one-half as if the other had survived. If there are more than two joint tenants and all of them have so died
the property thus distributed shall
be in the proportion that one bears to the
62
whole number of joint tenants."
The paucity of our language undoubtedly compelled the draftsmen to
speak of each of the commorientes as though each had survived the other
(an obvious impossibility) in stating the basis for the distribution of the
jointly owned property,6 3 and one would be hypercritical to question the
Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400 (U. S. 1852); Matter of Majot, 199 N. Y. 29, 32, 92 N. E.
§ 303.
58. Broughton v. Randall, Cro. Eliz, 502, 78 Eng. Rep. Repr. 752 (1596) in which it
is stated that the son survived; but see the report of this case in Noy 64, 74 Eng. Rep.
Repr. 1032 in which it is stated that the father survived.
59. 2 Dick. 635, 21 Eng. Rep. Repr. 417 (1784).
57.

402, 403 (1910); RESTATEMENT, CONF=ICT or LAWS (1934)

60.

2 BLACKSTONE CoMM. 180.

61. McGhee v. Henry, 144 Tenn. 548, 234 S. W. 509 (1921); also see Vaughan v.
Borland, 234 Ala. 414, 175 So. 367 (1937).
62. N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 89, subd. 2; UNor0ozm SIrULTANous DEATH ACT, 9 U.
L. A. § 3. It should be noted that the provision does not expressly refer to community
property which is recognized by some states.
63. The same expression of the basis of distribution is to be found in the first sub-
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provision on this score. However, when we consider the substance of this
provision, it would appear that the draftsmen of the Act in dealing with
the distribution of the jointly-owned property proceeded in accordance
with purely historical and legal concepts governing the incidents of joint
tenancy in disregard of equities which may have attached to the joint
ownership. In the case of two joint tenants it is provided by the Act
that the property shall be distributed equally; in the case of more than
two, it is provided that the property shall be distributed "in the proportion that one bears to the whole number of joint tenants." While legally
the individual interests of joint tenants or tenants by the entirety are
always considered identical,6 4 it would seem inequitable and less in accord
with modern notions of property that the joint tenants should have the
same distributable interests if they happened to have contributed unequally to the purchase price of the property or to its present value.
It appears to be the English rule that in the latter case, while the joint
owners hold the legal title in equal shares, there is a resulting trust to
each in proportion to his contribution.65 There also is support for this
view in the New York law.66 It is submitted that a distribution, more
just and less legalistic, would be one in which the property were simply
distributed as though the commorientes had been tenants in common, or,
to be more explicit, in proportion to their equitable interests. It may be
argued that the provision of the Act in question was not intended to
prevent the application of equitable principles and also that the first
section of the Act might govern. However, the unambiguous language
employed in the provision relating to joint tenants, read by itself, requires that the property be distributed equally regardless of the beneficial interests involved. It is believed that joint tenancies and those by
the entirety, in which there have been unequal contributions, occur frequently enough 67 to warrant a re-examination and clarification of this
provision.
division; N. Y. DEc. EST.

LAW

§ 89, subdiv. 1; UN=OR

SrwurLTANEous DAT

AcT, 9 U.

L. A. § 1.
64. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, (3d ed. 1939) § 418.
65. Lake v. Gibson, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 291, 21 Eng. Rep. Repr. 1052 (1729); Rigden v.
Vallier, 3 Atk. 731, 26 Eng. Rep. Repr. 1219 (1751).
66. See Matter of Strong, 171 Misc. 445, 452, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 544, 552 (Surr. Ct.
1939), noted in (1940) 25 CORN. L. Q. 316, which involved the simultaneous deaths of
husband and wife, tenants by the entirety, and in which it was held that since the entirety
bad been created wholly out of the husband's means, the property passed as though it
had been owned by him alone before the simultaneous deaths.
67. Both the InTEuNAL REVENUE CODE [§ 811 (e); 26 U. S. C. A. § 811 (e) 19421 and the
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Except as just noted, the provision dealing with joint tenants appears
to represent a codification of the prevailing view of the law.6 8 Mention
should be made, however, of one interesting New York decision which
comes close to deviating from the current of authority (and therefore
from the Act), if it does not actually do so. The case is Bierbrauer v.
Moran,69 in which a husband murdered his wife and then committed suicide. The Appellate Division reversed a finding by the trial court that
the husband had survived the wife and decided that, even though there
was no proof of survivorship, the property which they had held as joint
tenants should be distributed in its entirety to the wife's heir and not to

the husband's devisee. The court, though it recognized the general rule
that, in the absence of proof of survivorship, the jointly-held property

should devolve as though it had been hekl by the commorientes as tenants
in common, decided that the whole title should pass to the wife's heir on
the principle enunciated in Riggs v. Palmer ° that no one should be permitted to profit by his own wrong. However, the effect of the decision

was to deprive the husband's estate of the interest in the property which,
under the rule ordinarily applicable to joint tenants, the husband pos-

sessed at the time of his death. As to this interest of the husband in the
property, the holding seems to amount to the penalty of forfeiture for
crime,71 which has been done away with in New York. 72 A rationale

which could support the decision is the invocation of a presumption
New YoRX TAX LAW [§ 249-r (5)] recognize for purposes of estate taxation the amounts
originally contributed by the respective joint tenants.
68. McGhee v. Henry, 144 Tenn. 548, 234 S. W. 509 (1921).
69. 244 App. Div. 87, 279 N. Y. Supp. 176 (4th Dep't 1935); also see In re Sipworth
£1935] 1 Ch. 89.
70. 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188 (1889).
71. See Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N. E. 838 (1935), discussed in (1935)
4 FORDH m L. REv. 510 holding that a joint tenant was entitled to the entire property, although he had murdered the other joint tenants, on the ground that a joint tenant-is seized
of an undivided whole from the time of the creation of the estate. In Barnett v. Couey,
244 Mo. App. 913, 27 S. W. (2d) 757 (1930) it was held that the murder effects a severance
of the joint tendncy into a tenancy in common. Some courts give the estate to the tenant
(or his heirs) having the greater life expectancy charged with a trust in favor of the other
tenant (or his heirs) for the period of his life expectancy. Bryant v. Bryant, 19-3 N. C. 372,
137 S. E. 188 (1927); Sherman v. Weber, 133 N. J. Eq. 451, 167 At]. 517 (1913). New
York places a trust on the entire estate for the benefit of the victim's heirs, completeIy
ignoring the "vested rights" argument, Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188 (1889);
Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 173 (1918).
72. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 512. See also: U. S. CoNsT. Art. III, § 3: "No attainder of
treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the lifetime of the
person attainted."

30

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

that the victim outlived her murderer and this is the basis upon which the
decision is explained in a later case.7" Nevertheless, a presumption that
the murderer predeceased his victim, particularly where, as here, the
probabilities would be the other way, is purely fictitious and appears to
be a mere makeshift utilized by the court to transfer to the victim's
estate what would normally pass to the murderer's estate. One apparent
justification for invoking such a presumption is the argument that the
murder foreclosed the possibility that the victim might have survived
her husband, in which case she and her heir would have received the
estate free from the possibility of her husband's survivorship. A more
forceful ground for justifying the' result reached by the court is that,
had the murderer survived, he would have been declared, at least in
New York,7 4 a constructive trustee of the estate for the benefit of his
victim's heirs. A fortiori, the murderer's heirs should acquire no greater
rights, where he is not proved to have survived. If these reasons constitute valid grounds for the holding, then it may be that we must accept
the Bierbrauercase as a special-circumstance exception to the joint tenancy provision of the Uniform Act.
The Case of Insured and Beneficiary
The third subdivision of the New York statute provides:
"Where the insured and the beneficiary in a policy of life or accident insurance have died and there is no sufficient evidence that they have died otherwise than simultaneously the proceeds of the policy shall be distributed as
if the insured had survived the beneficiary. 75
The above provision., specifically dealing with the case of the simultaneous deaths of insured and beneficiary, is not a mere particular application of the rules provided for in the two preceding subdivisions of the
New York Statute. Those rules govern the distribution of property belonging to the deceased at the time of his death. It is not until an insured dies that the proceeds of the policy come into existence. While
in a substantial sense it is due to the act of the insured that the beneficiary becomes entitled to the proceeds of the policy, they never belonged
73. Matter of Sparks, 172 Misc. 642, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 926 (Surr. Ct. 1939). The court
stated that the plaintiff who had been in prison for ten years for the killing of his wife
would be presumed not to have survived her.
74. Ellerson v. Westcott, 148 N. Y. 149, 42 N. E. 540 (1896).
75. N. Y. DEc. EST. LAw, § 89, subd. 3; UNITORM SMrLT a EOus DEAT AcT, 9 U.
L. A. § 4.,
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to the-deceased as his property"8 and it would appear, therefore, that the
provisions contained in the first two subdivisions of the New York
statute would not apply to the distribution of the proceeds of the policy.
The third subdivision was clearly required to deal with the situation.
It should be noted at the outset that, given a purely literal interpretation, the insurance provision of the statute is not restricted to cases
where the rights of the beneficiary depend upon his survivorship of the
insured. In terms the provision applies to the simultaneous death of
any beneficiary and insured. However, when we bear in mind the purpose of the statute and the fact that its other provisions, dealing with
dispositions of property in case of simultaneous death, are brought into
operation only where the order of death would affect the disposition of
property, it seems certain that the insurance provision only applies where
the rights of the beneficiary depend upon survivorship of the insured.
Take the case of a policy payable to the beneficiary, "his executors, administrators or assigns." The almost unanimous view of the courts is
that the interest of such beneficiary in the proceeds of the policy becomes absolutely vested upon his designation as beneficiary, and even
if he should predecease the insured, the proceeds will go to the estate of
the deceased beneficiary. 7 The legislature could hardly have intended
the insurance provision of the statute to apply merely because the beneficiary and lhe insured happened to die simultaneously, for in such a case
the order of death is unimportant. There are other instances in which
the simultaneous death of a beneficiary with the insured would not appear
to deprive the estate*of the beneficiary of the vested interest which the
beneficiary had in the proceeds of the policy during his life time: an
"assured" who procures and maintains the contract of insurance on the
life of the insured, such as a creditor of the insured;"' a beneficiary who
has given a valuable consideration for his designation as such in a
policy procured and paid for by the insured. 9
76. Ward v. New York Life Insurance Co., 225 N. Y. 314, 319, 122 N. E. 207, 208 (1919).

77.

Sterritt v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 38 App. Div. 599, 52 N. Y. Supp. 1132 (2d Dep't

1899) ; cf. Johnson v. Van Epps, 110 Ill. 551 (1884). It might also be urged that the insurance provision would not apply, since this is a case "where a provision other than that
provided for by this section has been made for'the disposition of property", N. Y. DEc.
EsT. LAW, § 89, subd. 4; cf. UNisoam SMDLTANEOUS DEATr AcT, 9 U. L. A. § 6, where
the language differs slightly but the sense is the same; see infra, page 00.
78. See Ferdon v. Canfield, 104 N. Y. 143, 10 N. E. 146 (1887); Connecticut Mutual
Life Insurance Co. ,v. Luchs, 108 U. S. 498, 2 Sup. Ct. 949 (1883).
79. See Smith v. National Benefit Society, 123 N. Y. 85, 25 N. E. 197 (1890). Furthermore, a strict interpretation of the word "beneficiary", as used in the statute, would seem
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The case which will call the provisions of the statute into operation
is the one where the terms of the policy make survivorship a condition
to payment of the proceeds. The common law principle is that survivorship is an affirmative proposition to be proven like any other fact.8" In
a case where there is no proof as to the actual survivorship of insured
or beneficiary, the claimant upon whom the law casts the burden of
proof-the secondary beneficiary or the personal representative of the
insured or of the primary beneficiary-must fail in his claim. Lack of
harmony, if not confusion, exists in the decisions upon this important
question of the burden of proof.
In a leading case, United States Casualty Co. v. Kacer,8 ' the policy
in question provided that upon the death of the insured the proceeds
should be payable to his daughter "if surviving." Both insured and
his daughter perished in a shipwreck. The Missouri court held that,
since the insured had not reserved the right to change the beneficiary,
her interest was vested, subject to being divested by her death before
the insured, and consequently, that the burden rested upon the representatives of the insured to prove that the beneficiary had not survived
the insured. - In other words the interest of the beneficiary was interpreted as being subject to a condition subsequent. In MacGowin v.
Menken, 83 the proceeds of the policy were payable to the insured's wife
"if living," if not, to his estate. The New York Court of Appeals held
that the survivorship of the wife was a condition precedent to her taking
and that, therefore, her personal representative had the burden of provto comprise only donee-beneficiaries; see VANCE, INSURANCE (2d. ed. 1930) 537; 2 COOLEY,
BRiFs OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE (2d ed. 1927) 1298.
80. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2532; Whittier, Problems of Survlvorship
(1904) 16 GREEN BAG 237.
81. 169 Mo. 301, 69 S. W. 370 (1891).
82. Accord: Cowman v. Rogers, 73 Md. 403, 21 AtI. 64 (1891); contra: Hildebrandt
v. Ames, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 377, 66 S. W. 128 (1901), which follows the trust theory,
i.e., that the insurer is a trustee, the insured a settlor and the beneficiary a cestui .que trust;
the trustee cannot be compelled to execute the trust before it is proven that the contingency
which entitled the cestui to the fund has happened, in default of which proof there is a
reversion; the only "vested interest" is one in expectancy, liable to be divested by the predecease of the beneficiary, and not one in possession. The court distinguished Paden v.
Briscoe, 81 Tex. 568, 17 S. W. 42 (1891) on the ground that in the latter case there was
a second named beneficiary and therefor the burden of proof was on such substituted
beneficiary. Actually the second "named" beneficiary was "the heirs" of the insured.
Cf. Deyo v. Grosfeld, 163 Misc. 27, 294 N. Y. Supp. 1010 (Mun. Ct. 1936), aff'd 163
Misc. 30, 294 N. Y. Supp. 1014 (App. Term, 1st Dep't 1937).
83. 223 N. Y. 509, 119 N. E. 877 (1918).

19441

NEW YORK SIMULTANEOUS DEATH LAW

ing that fact. The court expressly refused to adopt the reasoning of the
court in United States Casualty Co. v. Kacer resting its decision upon
the mere language of the condition. However, the court did distinguish
the latter case by pointing out that since in the New York case before it
the insured had reserved the right to change the beneficiary, the wife
did not have a vested interest but a mere expectancy, subject to being
defeated by the insured designating another beneficiary. 4 Other
decisions of the lower courts in New York have also seemingly disregarded the reasoning of the court in the Kacer decision, almost invariably placing the burden of proof upon the personal representative of
the beneficiary without animadverting to the question of whether the
right to change the beneficiary had been reversed. 5 It is true that in an
Appellate Division case,"6 decided prior to the MacGowin, case, the dissenting opinion made the point that the insured had not reserved the
right to change the beneficiary. 7 However, aside from this minority
reference to the distinguishing factor relied upon in the Kacer decision,
and the mention of it by our Court of Appeals in the MacGowin opinion,
the New York courts appear not to have considered the reservation of
the right to change the beneficiary as important in determining the
claimant upon whom rests the burden of proof. In a jurisdiction, such
as Missouri, which holds that a beneficiary's interest is vested, even
though conditionally, where the interest is terminable solely upon nonsurvivorship (as distinguished from the mere act of the insured in changing the beneficiary), the adoption of the Uniform Act will apparently
84. Only three cases have been found, however, where, in a policy under which the
right to change the beneficiary had been reserved, the linguage was held to constitute a
condition subsequent, with the burden of proof upon the personal representative of the
insured: Matter of Cava, 174 Misc. 750, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 999 (Surr. Ct. 1940); Watkins
v. Home Life Insurance Co., 137 Ark. 207, 208 S. W. 587 (1919) ; Roberts v. Hardin, 179
Ga. 114, 175 S. E. 362, 180 S. E. 634 (1934): and see, Matter of Valverde, 148 Misc. 49,
265 N. Y. Supp. 484 (Surr. Ct. 1933) ; but cf. Paden v'. Briscoe, 81 Tex. 563, 17 S. W. 42
(1891), in which the court construed the words "die before" as constituting survivorship a
condition precedent to the beneficiary taking.
85. Southwell v. Gray, 35 Misc. 740, 72 N. Y. Supp. 342 (Sup. Ct. 1901); Matter of
Hammer, 101 Misc. 351, 168 N. Y. Supp. 588 (Surr. Ct. 1917); Deyo v. Grosfeld, 163
Misc. 27, 294 N. Y. Supp. 1010 (Mun. Ct. 1936), aff'd 163 Misc. 30, 294 N. Y. Supp. 1014
(App. Term, 1st Dep't 1937); Morgan v. Sackett, 172 Misc. 855, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 583
(Sup. Ct. 1939); but cf. Matter of Cava, 174 Misc. 750, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 999 Surr.
Ct. 1940).
86. Dunn v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 141 App. Div. 478, 126 N. Y. Supp. 229
(1st Dep't 1910).
87. Id. at 483, 126 N. Y. Supp. at 233.
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alter the law. If we consider the decision in the MacGowin case as
broadly holding that the burden of proof will rest upon the beneficiary,
whether or not the right to change is reserved by the insured, the provision of the statute which distributes the proceeds as though the insured has survived makes no change in the New York law."8 In any
event, the delicate problem of fixing the burden of proof in a case of
simultaneous death is obviated by the adoption of what is in effect a
conclusive presumption that the insured survived.
The Case of Successive Beneficiaries
A notable feature of the New York statute is its failure to include the
following provision of the Uniform Act dealing with the situation where
successive beneficiaries die simultaneously:
"Where two or more beneficiaries are designated to take successively by
reason of survivorship under another person's disposition of property and
there is no sufficient evidence that these beneficiaries have died otherwise than
simultaneously the property thus disposed of shall be divided into as many
equal portions as there are successive beneficiaries and these portions shall
be distributed respectively to those who -would have taken in the event that
each designated beneficiary had survived." 89
One reason which suggests itself to account for New York's failure to
include this provision is the difficulty of readily envisaging the circumstances to which the above section of the Uniform Act was intended to
apply. 10 An instahce to which this provision might have been intended
to apply consists-of a case where property is devised to A for life, remainder to B if living at A's death, otherwise to C. A, B and C die under
such circumstances that it is impossible to prove the order of their
deaths.9 1 In such a case A would not appear to be a successive beneficiary,
88. See Foley, Inheritance Law Changes, N. Y. L. J., July 14, 1943, p. 98, col. 2.
89. UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT, 9 U. S. A. § 2. The Massachusetts and Wis-

consin legislatures have inserted "or alternatively" following "successively," and "or alternate"
following "successive." Mass. Gen. Laws (Ter. Ed.) c. 190 A. § 2; Wisc. Laws 1943,
c. 113 § 2.

90. Professor Wigmore, under a somewhat differently worded provision of a prior
draft of the Act, which will be found set out in 9 WIGooRE, EviEcNE (3d ed. 1940) 486,
gives the following example: "A will of X devises a lot of land to M for life with remainder

to N if living, but if N does not survive M, then a residuary bequest to charities. M and
N perish in a common disaster." Wigmore concludes that under his draft, N and the charity
would each receive one-half of the devise.

91. It is to be noted that no other section of the Law would cover this situation as the
property in suit is not that of one of the commorientes.

19441

NEW YORK SIMULTANEOUS DEATH LAW

since his interest does not succeed but precedes that of the othei beneficiaries. B and C are successive beneficiaries and under the above
quoted provision of the Uniform Act it was undoubtedly intended that
the property be divided equally between the heirs of B and C. This
would appear to be an equitable distribution, and would avoid a disposition of the property based-upon a nice distinction as to the onus of
the burden of proof, to which otherwise a judge must have recourse.
Where this provision of the Uniform Act does not govern (as in New
York today), C's heirs would take all the remainder if, by applying analogously the decision in MacGowin v. Menken, it is held that B's'heirs have
the burden of proving his survivorship as a condition precedent. However, if the reasoning employed by the court in United States Casualty
Co. v. Kacer, is to prevail in the case of successive beneficiaries named
in a will, then it may be argued that the burden of proof rests upon C's
heirs, since B had a vested remainder subject to being divested. 92
To give effect to the apparent intent of the draftsmen, an example has
been given above in -whichA, the life tenant, was one of the commorientes.
If A survived B and C, who had died simultaneously, it would seem that
C's heirs would take the entire remainder, since they would merely have
to show that B did not survive A. This would be true today in New
York,93 and if the Uniform Act was intended to give a contrary result
it is understandable why the New York legislature failed to adopt the
Act in its entirety.
In view, of the lack of clarity as to the meaning and scope of the provision dealing with successive beneficiaries and doubts as to its real
utility, one can appreciate the hesitation of -the New York legislature
in committing itself to this provision.
The Saving Provisions
The statute contains two saving provisions. The first provides that
the statute
cc... shall not apply in, the case of wills, living, trusts, deeds or contracts
of insurance wherein .a provision other than that provided for by this section
has been made for the disposition of property."94
Without this provision the statute might be construed as an invariable
92. See Schraub v. Griffin, 84 Md. 557, 36 Ati. 443 (1897).
93. Connelly v. O'Brien, 166 N. Y. 406, 60 N. E. 20 (1901).
94. N. Y. DEC. EST. LAw, § 89, subd. 4; UNiroaR SImLTANEous DEATH ACT, 9 U.
L. A. § 6. The New York statute contains an immaterial change in the language used in
the Uniform Act.
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rule for the devolution of property in the case of simultaneous deaths.
This could hardly have been intended since the Act was drafted to make
certain the devolution of property where evidence of survivorship is
lacking and where no aid can be obtained from the terms of an instrument under which the property passes. If the intention as to the distribution of property, in case of doubt as to priority of death, is manifested in an appropriate legal instrument, there should be no need to
call into play a statutory rule which is designed primarily to express the
presumed intent of the deceased.
In drafting a provision intended to render the statutory rule inoperative, caution would seem to dictate the omission of a statement as to
the time of death in the form of a presumption, at least in the case of a
will. A direct gift over by way of substitution seems preferable. Where
a testator undertakes to direct that he or a legatee shall be considered
to have died first without having made a gift by way of substitution, the
claim may be made that there is an attempt to evade the statute of
descent and distribution 5 However, so far as a New York estate is concerned this precaution is less imperative since in the well known case of
Matter of Fowes,96 Judge Crane, writing on this point held that a provision- stated thus presumptively constituted in legal -effect a valid substitutional gift. 97 Another matter which should be carefully considered
in framing the provision is the manner in which the event resulting in
the simultaneous death is described. It has been suggested that use of
the expression "common disaster" should be avoided. 8 This suggestion
has undoubtedly been made for two reasons. First there may later arise
a question as to whether the occasion of the "simultaneous" deaths does
constitute a common disaster. 99 Secondly, the deaths, though caused by
95. See opinion of Shearn, J., in the Matter of Fowles, 176 App. Div. 637, 641, 163 N. Y.
Supp. 873, 875 (1st Dep't 1917), rev'd 222 N. Y. 222, 118 N. E. 611 (1918).
96. 222 N. Y. 222, 239, 118 N. E. 611, 615 (1918). Although Judge Crane dissented.
this part of his opinion was adopted by the majority of the Court of Appeals; id. 234.
118 N. E. at 614.
97. A provision that if legatees died before the testator leaving issue the gifts should
not lapse "but should take effect as if his or her death had happened immediately after
mine" was given effect as a bequest to the personal representatives of the named legatees in
Matter of Greenwood [19121 1 Ch. Div. 392.
98. Tracy and Adams, Evidence of Survivorship in Common Disaster Cases (1940) 38
Micir. L. REV. 801, 830. For a recent decision in which the court held (somewhat narrowly,
it would seem) that the intention not to restrict the deaths to those resulting from a
common disaster was insufficiently expressed, see Matter of Bull, 175 Misc. 197, 23 N. Y. S.
(2d) 5 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
99. Tracy and Adams, loc. cit. supra note 98 at 801-803.
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a common disaster, may be separated by a considerable length of time 00
and this fact may not only frustrate the intention of the testator, insured or settlor but may also raise theoretical as well as practical difficulties. 10 '
The other saving provision contained in the New York statute'reads
as follows:
"Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed or construed to apply
to the disposition of broperty of a person who has died before the effective
date of this section or to the disposition of property passing under an instru-

02
ment, other than a will, executedbefore such date."'

The italicized portion of the statute does not appear in the Uniform
Act. 03 New York, apparently following the lead of Massachusetts, 04
added the italicized language to save the statute from grave doubts as
to its constitutionality. As previously emphasized throughout this discussion, the Act cannot be considered as establishing mere rules of evidence. It definitely constitutes a rule for the distribution of property
and if the statute were intended to alter vested property rights, it
would appear to violate both the due process' 05 and the contract 0 6
clauses of the Constitution.
The Scope of the Statute
This statute might become popularly known as the "Common Disaster
Law." 07 It would be highly inaccurate to thus describe it. Neither by
100. See for example Rutherford Trust Co. v. Stagg, 127 N. J. Eq. 541, 14 A. (2d)
514 (1940).
101. See Brown, May a Man Provide in His Will That His Wife Shall Not Take Under
it Unless She Shall Survive Him for a Period of Forty-eight Hours? (1925) 1 WASH. L.
REV. 135.
102. N. Y. DEC. EST. LAw § 89, subd. 5. The failure to include wills in the non-retroactiv(7 provision of the saving clause is understandable since a will is in its nature ambulatory and is not operative until the death of the testator.
103. UN-HoRm SImuLTANEOUS DEATH ACT, 9 U. L. A. § 5. There are other unsubstantial
differences in the language of the two provisions.
104. Mass. Gen. Laws (Ter. Ed.) c. 190 A, § 2.
105. U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 658 (U. S. 1829);
Citizens Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Topeka City, 20 Wall. 655 (U. S. 1875); Lowell v. City
of Boston, 111 Mass. 454 (1873).
106. U.S. CoxsT. ART. I, § 10; Randall v. Sackett, 77 N. Y. 480 (1879) ; Sturges v. Crownshield, 4 Wheat. 122 (U. S. 1819).
107. The initial drafts of the Act were entitled "Uniform Death in Common Disaster
Act"; see 1937 Handbook of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 'State
Laws 245. The Act was renamed in 1937 specifically in order to cover deaths "in disasters,
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its terms nor its implications can it be limited to deaths resulting from
common accidents or disasters. The statute should apply "wherever
there is no sufficient evidence that the persons have died otherwise than
simultaneously." This seems clearly to include situations where the
deaths actually occur at different times and where they do not at all
arise out of the same event or succession of events.' 8 For example, even
though the time of death of one of the persons is definitely established,
the statute by its terms should become operative where there is no proof
as to the relative time of death of another. The incidence of the Uniform
Simultaneous Death Law, under present war conditions, is obvious.
Where a person is reported missing in action there is a strong presumption of fact that he is dead. A large number of persons (civilians
as well as members of the armed forces) must have been, and will be,
killed in the present war under circumstances rendering the manner and
time of their deaths unknown. A peace-time instance, and one likely to
recur frequently, is found in In re Rhodes.' 9 There the owner of the
property disappeared. At the time he was last heard of his mother and
two brothers were his nearest kindred. Seven years thereafter, when
the presumption of death became effective, his next of kin were six
nephews, the mothe& and brothers having died in the seven year interval.
The question presented to the court was to whom should the property
pass, to the personal representatives of the next of kin who were alive
when the intestate was last heard of, or to the nephews. Although the
time of death of the mother and brothers was known, the time of their
death in relation to that of the presumed death of the owner of the property was uncertain."0 The court admitted itself unable to solve the
which were not common and under circumstances which were not disasters." The murder
at one time of three persons should come within the Act, although "the occurrence could
not be termed a 'disaster.'" 1938 Handbook 277. However in 1939 it was still called the
"Uniform Death in Common Disaster Act" 1939 Handbook 75.
108. The history of the Uniform Act clearly shows that it is applicable wherever sequence of death, determining the disposition of property, is in question. See Comment
(1943) 7 MD.L. REI,. 330. Both the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act and the Uniform
Absence As Evidence of Death and Absentees' Property Act (9 U. L. A.) were originally
embodied in the draft of the Uniform Presumption of Death Act. 1937 Handbook of
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 236.
109. L. R. 36 Ch. Div. 586 (1887).
110. The majority of decisions seem to hold that the presumption of death from seven
years' absence merely extends to the fact of death and neither to the time of death, Claywell v. Inter-Southern Life Ins. Co., 70 F. (2d) 569 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); Tyrrell v. Prudential Ins. Co., 109 Vt. 6, 192 Atl. 184 (1937), nor to the celibate, childless or intestate
condition of the person presumed to be dead, at the time of his death, Still v. Hutto, 48
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problem and suggested a compromise. If the court had been aided by
the present statute, seemingly the problem would be solved by applying the provision that where "there is no sufficient evidence that the
persons have died otherwise than simultaneously, the property of each
person shall be disposed of as if he had survived." 11' The property would,
therefore, have gone to the nephews because as to the intestate's property, he is deemed to have survived the mother and brothers. 2
While the rule of the statute applies only where the distribution of
property is in question, this factor is not in itself enough to bring the
statute into play. There must also be'involved the question of the order of
death of two or more persons. This limitation upon the scope of the
statute is graphically illustrated by the case of Durrant v. Friend,"' in
which a testator and certain of his chattels were lost at sea. These chattels had been bequeathed by the testator to specific legatees. The chattels
had been insured and there was a contest between the specific, legatees
and the executors of the estate as to the disposition of the proceeds of
the insurance. If the testator had died before the chattels were lost, the
executors would have held the insurance for the benefit of the legatees,
whereas if the testator had "survived" his chattels, the legacies would
S. C. 415, 26 S. E. 713 (1897), Lachowicz v. Lechowicz, Md. , 30 A.
(2d) 793 (1943); see 9 WioMoRE, EVmENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2531a. However, in Connor v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 179 App. Div. 596, 166 N. Y. Supp. 985 (2d Dep't 1917) the
court stated that the general rule in New York is that, in the absence of other evidence
as to the time of death, there is a presumption that death occurred at the end of the seven
year period. Cases in other jurisdictions support this view; see cases collected in Notes
(1925) 34 A. L. R. 1389, (1931) 75 A. L. R. 630.
111. See Shraub v. Griffen, 84 Md. $57, 36 At. 443 (1897).
112. In New York under the presumption stated in Coxinor v. New York'Life Ins. Co.,
note 110 supra, the same result would be reached without recourse to the Uniform Simultaneous Death Law. However, it would seem that the Uniform Simultaneous Death Law
would prevail over the presumption that*death occurs at the end of the seven year period.
In a case where the time of death of the intestate is known but the next of kin (such as
the mother or brothers in the Rhodes case) are presumed to have died after a period of
seven years' absence within which the intestate has died, under the rule of property set
forth in the Uniform Act, the intestate's property would be distributed as though he had
survived. This statutory rule of property would govern despite the aforementioned presumption because "there is no sufficient evidence" as to the order of death, the presumption not constituting evidence. THAYER, A Paa
HARY TRsATisE ox EvmDmqc AT THE
COMMON LAW (1898) 337; (1943) 12 FoRDHAx L. REV. 185, 187. As to what constitutes
evidence see Fidelity Mutual Life Association v. Mettler, 185 U. S. 308, 22 Sup. Ct. 662
(1902) and Leach v. Hall, 95 Iowa 611, 64 N. W. 790 (1895).
113. 2 De G. & S. 343, 64 Eng. Rep. Repr. 1145 (1852).
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have adeemed. The court held that the testator and his chattels had
perished together and found for the executors.
One more word of comment upon the scope of the Act. The statute
only applies where there is "no sufficient evidence" of the order of death.
It may be asked whether the adoption of the statute was intended to
raise the quantum or quality of the .evidence, sufficient to warrant an
inference of survivorship, over what is now the prevailing standard of
proof. Little can be added to the discussion of evidence in survivorship
cases contained in an excellent article recently written upon the subject." 4 The evidence offered in such cases would lead one to question
whether rights to property should depend upon such tenuous proofvery often in close cases opinion or cadaveric evidence. It has been held
in an extreme decision that even a "shadow of evidence" is sufficient to
determine the question of survivorship." 5 The Uniform Act, which
affords an equitable distribution of property in cases of contemporaneous deaths, diminishes the necessity of drawing tenuous findings from
meagre or barely probative circumstantial evidence, and it will be a question of statutory construction for the courts whether the expression
"sufficient evidence" used in the Act was intended to have any special
significance. That expression, as used in other statutes, has been interpreted as requiring a higher than the ordinary standard of proof."'
The expression takes an added meaning when viewed in the light afforded
by. the history of the Act. In its penultimate draft, the Act contained
a provision that "a priority of time shall not be deemed to be sufficiently
evidenced unless such an interval of time between the deaths is shown
to have elapsed that the survivor had a clear period of consciousness.""' 1
This "clear period of consciousness" test was omitted from the final
draft on the ground that to require more than just survivorship was not
114. Tracy and Adams, Evidence of Survivorship in Common Disaster Cases (1940)
38 MIcH. L. REV. 801.
115. Pell v. Ball, 1 Cheves Eq. 99, 103 (S. C. 1840) ; see also Coyle v. Leach, 8 Metc.
371 (Mass. 1844) ; cf. Matter of Burza, 151 Misc. 577, 212 N. Y. Supp. 248 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
4 CATHOtIC ENCYCLOPOEDIA, 662 states: "The only absolutely certain sign of death is
decomposition."
116. Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Trammel, 53 Fed. 196 (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1892);
Campbell v. Bums, 94 Me. 127, 46 At. 812 (1900) ; State ex rel. Sterling v. Shain, 344 Mo.
891, 129 S. W. (2d) 1048 (1939); c. Britain v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 95 Ohio
St. 391, 115 N. E. 110 (1917).
117. 1939 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws 211.
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germane to the object of the legislation."" It should not follow that,
because the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws determined to discard the "clear period of consciousness" test, there was no intention to
improve the standard of proof which would preclude the application of
the Act.
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion indicates that, for the most part, the statute
merely codifies the pre-existing New York law. Nevertheless the impact
of the statute as a new rule of law will be perceived when there comes
under consideration the distribution of property of those who have not
died in a "common disaster" but the order of whose death is unknown.
Despite possible defects in draftsmanship (perhaps inevitable in this
type of legislation), the statute as a whole constitutes a distinct advance
towards the goal of certainty and uniformity in the law. The draftsmen
have wisely limited the scope of the Act and have not attempted to
embrace all problems which may arise from simultaneous deaths. Nevertheless, some provision might have been drafted defining simultaneous
death in such a manner as to exclude short intervals between the
deaths." 9 The opportunity to dispose of the property which would come
to the actual survivor by reason of survivorship is a minimum incident of
the enjoyment of such property. Any interval of time which is so brief
as to preclude even the exercise of this privilege should be disregarded
in determining survivorship. The alternative method 'bf solving this
problem is by the less satisfactory technique of formulating arbitrary
presumptions as rules of evidence. Not having gone so far as to overcome the difficulty by the means suggested, it is commendable that no
attempt was made to encumber the Act with rules of evidence inappropriate in a law creating a rule of property intended to be uniform
through the states.
A global war of the kind now being fought will inevitably result
in a great many deaths, the time of which will be unascertainable. The
Simultaneous Death Law has the merit of timeliness in its grim practicality.
118.
119.

Ibid at 209, 211-213.
Legis. (1936) Hauv. L. REv. 344, 349.

